





Risk, and·U.S. Regulatory Policies
Robert Johnston*
The overseas expansion of the U.S. banking
ind.ustry has produceda networkofbranches and
subsidiaries whose assets and liabilities now ex-
ceed $200 billion, primarilyon the basis ofan up-
surge·in activity over the past decade. Despite
concern aboutthis rapid increase in overseas ac-
tivitY,1 international banking has exhibited great
resiliency in financing world trade in the face of
the strains associated with recession and infla-
tion. Nonetheless, the size and character of the
banks' foreign assets and liabilities present spe-
cial problems to regulators in supervising inter-
national banking.
This paper presents.an analysis ofthese inter-
national regulatory problems; Section I reviews
recent trends in U.S. banks' international oper-
ations, showing the increased numbers ofpartici-
pating banks and the growth in international
credits. Section IIdiscusses the rationale for reg-
ulation in general, and Section III examines the
risks in international banking that could require
regulation. The last section assesses current reg-
ulatory problems and trends in the light of the
preceding analysis.
I. Growth ofInternational Operations
As recently as 1965, U.S. foreign banking was
dominated by 13 large banks with considerable
experience in the field (Table 1). But then there
began a rush of new banksto establish foreign
offices} By 1973, when the rush slowed, 125 U.s.
banks were operating 737 branches overseas,
with total assets of$129.9 billion; The number of
branches has changed little in subsequent years,
buttotalassets have continued.to grow, reaching
$222.9 billion by March 1977.3 This figure
equalled 22 percent ofdomestic bank assets and
approximately three times U.S. banks' equity
capital. Indeed, for some large banks, claims on
foreigners amount to as much as one-quarter to
one-halfoftotalassets (Table 2).
Thedecade ofthe 1960'swas marked by rapid
growth of international trade, full convertibility
ofmost ofthe majorcurrencies, and rapid expan-
sion overseas by major U.S. corporations. U.S.
banks participated in this overseas movement not
only because of a search for new opportunities,
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but also becauseofaneed toexpand overseas op-
erations in orderto meet the needs oftheir corpo-
rate customers. In this period, international
trade more than quadrupled and generated addi-
tional demand for finance. A major new finan-
cial institution arose in the form of the Eurodol-
lar market, enabling foreign branches to raise
needed funds outside the United States without
being subjeCt to domestic reserve requirements
and interest-rate ceilings. In addition, U.s. con-
trols on capital flows affectedinternational
banking trends. From 1965 to 1974, U.S. banks
were hampered from making foreign loans di-
rectly from their domestic offices by the so-
called Voluntary Foreign Credit Restraint Pro-
gram. Therefore, during much of this period,
banks were encouraged to fund their overseas
lending from externalsources, and banks without
foreign branches were at a disadvantage in com-
peting for international business. At other times,
slow domestic-business demand encouraged U.s.
banks to look overseasfor customers.
This period ofenthusiastic overseas expansion
came to an end by 1974. For one reason, the dis-2. United Kingdom
Total, all currencies 81.5






Total, all currencies 66.8
Total, payablein U.S. dollars 62.7
Source: Board ofGovernors ofthe Federal Reserve System.
mantling of controls on capital flows permitted
more lending from home offices. But in addition,
many banks by this time found that international
banking required skills which they did not have,
and many found that the costs were higher and
theprofits lower thanexpected.
The international-banking scene took on a
new character beginning in 1974. The sharp in-
crease in oil prices that year created massive
trade surpluses for oil-exporting nations along
with .large deficits for the major oil-importing
countries. In part, the deficits were financed in-
directly by the oil-exporting countries recycling
funds through the international-banking system.
Commercial banks played a key role in this pro-
cess by using theoil exporters' deposits to finance
the imports of oil importing countries. Interna-
tional lending jumped 44 percent (in dollar
terms) between year-end 1974 and 1976-anim-
pressive amount even after allowing for the 12-
percent rise in prices over the period (Table 1).
This explains much of the increase in the assets
and liabilities of U.S. foreign branches during
the 1974-76 period.4
Despite the movement of many small U.S.
banks overseas, the market remains dominated
by the giant multinational banks. Just 9 of the
14,000 banks in this country account for 540 of
the 737 overseas branches and 77 percent of the
overseas assets. Over 70 ofthe 125 banks operat-
ing outside the United States have only "shell
branches" in offshore money markets, such as
Nassau or the Cayman Islands.5
In most cases, "shell branches" are more a le-















































(as ofyear-end exceptJune 1977)
(June)
1960 1965 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
NumberofU.S. banks
with overseas branches 8 13 53 79 91 108 122 125 126 127 130
Numberofoverseas
branches 131 211 459 536 583 627 697 734 762 731 737
Assets ofbranches*
($ billion) 3:5 9.1 35.3 46.5 59.8 78.2 121.9 151.9 176.5 219.2 NA
Source: BoardofGovernorsofthe Federal Reserve System.
*Includes inter-branch funds.
37signed to such branches areoffshore transactions
and not subject to domestic reserve require-
ments. Lending decisions can be made at the
U.s. head office or elsewhere, and funds can be
raised in London to supply loans to customers
outside the United States through the books of
these branches. This arrangement allows smaller
banks which could not justify the high overhead
expense ofoverseas-branch operation in such lo-
cations as London or Frankfurt to obtain off-
shore funds for their foreign lending. After ad-
justing for these shell branches, the number of
banks with true foreign branches or subsidiaries
is muchsmallerthanthetotals indicate.
Indeed, only a few large banks have the re-
sourCes to maintain extensive branch networks
and to raise the funds needed by large interna-
tional borrowers. Because of their size, these
bankscan reduce the threat oflosses by diversifi-
cation and can build up the necessary staff to
evaluate foreign credits properly. Smaller banks,
in contrast, try to reduce their risk exposure by
concentratingtheirefforts in the interbankEuro-
dollar.market and in thedeveloped countries.
II. Rationale ForBankingRegulation
The rationale for banking regulation in this
country is based upon the need, first, to promote
economic stability and, second, to promote com-
petition. The first goal attempts to minimize dis-
ruptions originating in the banking sector that
cause fluctuations in output or employment. Be-
cause commercial banking in a modern economy
is the source of the bulk of the domestic money
supply and the provider of crucial financial ser-
vices, public policy is always concerned with the
stability of the banking system as well as the
soundness ofindividual banks. In fact, the Feder-
al Reserve System from its inception has had the
responsibility ofminimizing financial instability.
The System was designed to act as lender oflast
resort-from which responsibility evolved its
monetary-policy role-and also to act as the su-
pervisor for state-chartered member banks. The
ComptrolleroftheCurrency, which had been the
first Federal supervisory agency, has retained its
responsibility for nationally-chartered banks,
while the Federal Deposit InsuranceCorporation
since the 1930's has taken on supervisory respon-
sibilities for state banks which are not members
ofthe Federal Reserve System.
The second regulatory policy goal is mainte-
nance of competition.6 Banking is regulated to
prevent undue concentration of financial re-
sources in commercial banking, and also to pre-
serve competition among nonbanking institu-
tions by keeping banks out ofthatarena. Various
Federal laws are directed to this end. Under the
Glass-Steagall Act of 1932, commercial banking
is separated from so-called investment banking.?
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This is in contrast to the tradition ofcontinental
Europe, where French and German banks typi-
cally combine both functions. In addition, the
Bank Merger Act of 1960 established competi-
tive standards for the approval ofbanking acqui-
sitions and mergers, while the 1970 amendments
to the Bank Holding Company Act set similar
rules to limit the expansion ofcorporations con-
trolling banks into nonbanking financial
activities.
Both objectives have resulted in the expansion
of government regulation over banking. The
competitive goal rests upon well-known theoreti-
cal foundations: increased concentration in a
market tends to reduce output and to raise mar-
ket price. It follows that regulation is necessary
to prevent undesirable concentration. The value
ofeconomic stability can also be readily accept-
ed, although the theoretical case for bank regula-
tion is less obvious in this case. The concept of
financial stability-or rather instability-really
concerns attitudes toward risk. Would unregu-
lated banks build their portfolios in a way that
would expose the financial sector to increased
risk, and thus bring about increased (and unde-
sirable) fluctuations in real economic activity? It
may be assumed that regulation, by reducing
risk, improves the functioning of the financial
system by lowering the chance of destabilizing
losses.
The banks themselves, as profit-making insti-
tutions, have an incentive to protect themselves
against risk.8 Risk cannot be avoided but portfo-
lio diversification can reduce it. Banks must de-cidehow much expected risk they are willing to
tradeoffforanincreasein expected return. They
may respond to higher risk by charging higher
interest rates, or by demanding increased collat-
eral or loan guarantees. The banks themselves
certainly are aware of the problem of risk. The
policy question comes down to whether, in mak-
ing individual risk assessments, the banks' pri-
vate decisions result in risk-taking that is higher
thansocietyprefers.
It has been argued that existing institutional
arrangements tend to encourage risk-taking.9
Deposit insurance, for example, tends to increase
incentives for banks to take more risk, by taking
over the role traditionally filled by bank capital.
Specifically, government-sponsored insurance
protectsdepositors by making them less sensitive
to a bank's capital position, and thus encourages
bankers to increase their leverage and, therefore,
their risk exposure.
In effect, deposit insurance tends to shift risk
to the public sector. To the extent that official
international-Iending arrangements-through
(say) the International Monetary Fund-actas a
form of international deposit-insurance, banks
maybetempted to increase riskexposure beyond
some social optimum. While such support may
result in greater overall international stability,
regulation maybe needed to keep individual
banks' riskexposurewithinacceptablelimits.
Inaddition, regulation may bejustifiedwhere
regulators are better qualified than the.banks
themselves to assess the banks'own risks. This
mayseem tobea strongassumption, butexamin-
ers develop considerable expertise through their
constant evaluation ofbank records. Banking
regulation can be viewed as imposing standards
based on contemporary "best-practice," with
those standards shifting over time as experience
confirms the safety ofnew practices. Regulation
standards are moving averages which tend to
smooth trends in banking, thereby reducing the
chanceofmajorvariations in riskiness.
Poor internal procedures may induce undue
risk-taking and expose a bank to unnecessary
losses. Managers may gather insufficient infor-
mation for assessing loan quality, or they may
delegate too much loan authority, or they may
concentrate their loans in too few areas. When




















































Assets Held as Claims on ForeignCountriesbyHead Offices

















Source: BoardofGovernorsofthe Federal ReserveSystem
'This includes claims on private individuals, businesses, and banks in foreign countries, as well as foreign governments
andtheir agencies.
39in obtaining data, or may encounter difficulties
in assessing credit risk because of lack of famil-
iarity with local customers. Yet the same prob-
lemexists domestically when a bank considers
lending to customers outside its usual markets.
Similar types of problems occur in assessing
banking risk both internationally and domesti-
cally, and the basic process of judging credit-
worthiness is not fundamentally different.
The factor distinguishing international bank-
ingfrom domestic banking is the presence of
"sovereign risk." Even if the foreign customer is
financially able to repay a loan-that is, there is
no "banking risk" in the sense of commercial
bankruptcy-his country's government may pre-
vent the appropriate conversion of foreign ex-
change to repay the bank loan. This is a default
on the national level, not the private level, as will
be seen from thediscussion in the next section.
International lending thus presents risks simi-
lar to the normal commercial risks of domestic
lending, with the one exception ofsovereign risk.
What role then does regulation have to play?
Without regulation, commercial banks might
choosea combination ofrisk and expected return
thatiSl.Ul.aCceptable from a socialviewpoint. And
even ifbanks assess risk correctly, they may un-
dertake activities that expose the U.S. banking
system to disturbances which are unacceptable
onpublic-policygrounds.
On the other hand, maintenance of competi-
tion is not yet a policy problem for international
banking supervision. Ordinarily, the foreign op-
erations of U.S. banks have no direct impact on
domestic competition. Competitive effects inside
other countries are regarded as matters for those
countries to assess in terms oftheir own econom-
ic policy. U.S. banks are allowed to engage in
many activities overseas that are not permitted
for competitive reasons inside their own coun-
try-a primeexample being investment banking.
To forbid such activities would be to put U.S.
banks at a disadvantage compared to their for-
eign competitors. Therefore the principal prob-
lem for international-banking regulation con-
cerns risk, not competition. How risky, then, is
international banking?
III. Risk in International Banking
Banking risk-one of the major types of risk
facing international bankers-involves the as-
sessment of borrowers' credit standing or the
forecasting ofdeposit flows. As noted above, this
is the same type ofrisk that bankers have to face
on thedomestic scene. Itmay be more difficult to
obtain credit information abroad, but this only
means that U.S. banks have less familiarity than
their foreign competitors with local conditions. A
similar situation exists when a domestic bank at-
tempts to make domestic loans outside its usual
markets. Yet as a practical matter, it takes time
to build the expertise to interpret foreign finan-
cial practices and to develop appropriate sources
of information. Consequently, many U.S. banks
tend to restrict their foreign lending to major in-
ternational corporations or financial institutions.
This policy reflects the costs of gathering local
information, and is not different in character
from the basic process of making credit judg-
ments about domestic borrowers.
When operating abroad, bankers must take
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into consideration many of the same economic
factors that they deal with at home-govern-
ment fiscal and monetary policy, bank regula-
tory policy, foreign exchange controls and local
economic conditions generally. Although many
countries tend to have unstable economies be-
cause of undue dependence on a few basic pro-
ducts or because of political difficulties, other
countries may have greater economic stability
than the United States. Moreover, most devel-
oped countries provide ample information on
economic conditions that allow reasonable eco-
nomic forecasting. For others, however, great un-
certainty exists about their economic prospects,
so banking risks may be considerably higher and
sovereign risk may be a greater concern.
Actually, there are few cases where countries
refuse to repay (or refuse permission for their
citizens to repay) foreign loans, because borrow-
ing countries do not want to foreclose the possi-
bility ofobtaining foreign credit again in the fu-
ture. The word default is usually applied-not tooutright refusal to repay-but rather to. a case
where loans are rescheduled or renegotiated
through agreement with lenders. (This same sit-
uation arises domestically when banks change
loan terms to help troubled borrowers instead of
forcing insolvency.) Because countries generally
attempt to avoid outrightdefault, few cases have
arisen in the last twenty years where banks ex-
periencedserious losses from sovereign risk.
Commercial banks have acted to protect
themselves against this type ofinternational risk
exposure. They have built up their systems for
assessing economic conditions in individual
countries-in many cases, systems of consider-
able sophistication. In addition, they have fol-
lowed policies ofgeographic as well as industrial
diversification to reduce risk exposure (Table 3).
In terms of geographic diversification, most
loans are concentrated in developed countries or
in interbank transactions, while loans to under-
developed countries represent only a minor part
ofthe total. In particular, loans to less-developed
non-OPEC countries are not unduly large in
terms of the relative commitment by U.s. banks
and the ability ofmost ofthese countries to ser-
vice their debts.10 Loans to six countries (Argen-
tina, Brazil, Mexico, the Philippines, Korea, and
Taiwan) represent three-quarters of U.S. banks'
credits in thiscategory-buta strongcasecan be
mllde for lending to these countries because of
both their international reserves and their long-
rungrowth prospects.11
A measure ofthe efficiency of U.S. banking
practices is the fact that loan losses on banks' in-
ternational portfoiios have been smaller than on
their domestic loans. 12 Recent failures of large
banks cannot be attributed simply to risky inter-
national loans. Foreign-exchange losses did con-
tributetothe failure ofFranklin National Bank,
but those losses reflected poor internal controls
which were also typical of the bank's domestic
operations.
Through diversification, improved informa-
tion systems, and appropriate internal controls,
banks have established a reassuring record ofin-
ternational operations. However, banks' collec-
tive risk assessment may still result in a banking
system that is too risky from the viewpoint ofso-
ciety, and the function of banking supervision is
to keep risk exposure within acceptable bound-
aries. Foreign risk, to the extent it affects thesta-
bility ofthe domestic banking system, makes su-
pervision ofinternationalbankingnecessary.
IV. CurrentRegulatory Practicesand Problems
Federal supervisory authority over U.s.
banks'foreign operations is exercised by the Fed-
eral Reserve System and the Comptroller of the
Currency.13 The Comptroller of the Currency
has the responsibility for examining national
banks, which make up the majority of those
banks operating overseas. The Federal Reserve
System has the responsibility for examining
state-chartered member banks, and for approv-
ing national banks' foreign branches and the in-
vestments of foreign subsidiaries (either directly
or indirectly through Edge Act subsidiaries).
Foreign acquisitions by domestic-bank holding
companies also require Federal Reserve
approval.
Supervisory authorities rely primarily on
banks' home-office records in performing inter-
national examinations-and until recently they
relied almost entirely on such records. This pro-
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cedure was acceptable as long as few banks had
overseas offices, since the records at hand were
satisfactory for the evaluation ofmost loans, and
the risks from foreign operations were quite
small. But as the number and size offoreign as-
sets grew, on-site examination of branches also
became necessary. The Comptroller of the Cur-
rency now maintains a permanent staff in Lon-
don, and both Federal agencies are increasing
the frequency of their overseas examinations.
These on-site examinations are used primarily to
check the accuracy of head-office records and
the adequacy of internal controls rather than to
reviewthequalityoflocal assets. Regularexami-
nation ofall foreign offices would be very costly,
without any assurance of a compensating in-
creasein supervisoryeffectiveness.
For a time, the regulatory agencies assumed
that foreign banking regulators could help moni-torthe activities ofU.S. banks overseas. Howev-
er,experienc~has shown that few banking au-
thorities conduct supervision on the scale
practiced in this country. Most countries' au-
thoritiesemphasfze regulation for purposes of
monetary policy, foreign-exchange control or
other\economic-policy.objectives. Even in coun-
trieshavillg.veryextensive regulatory systems,
sucnasJapan, the emphasis is upon checking for
conformity with<banking regulations.rather than
uponexatniningfor.the quality of credit ex-
teIldecjbyforeign branches. U.S. regulators thus
mustrelyprimarily.upontheirown procedures to
supervise U.s. banks' foreign operations.
A, particularly difficult supervisory problem
in assuring adequate diversification concerns the
assessment of the risks assigned to loalls in par-
ticular countries-that is, country risk, which
covers both "sovereign risk" and the impact on
"banking risk" of local economic conditions. As
noted above, banks are now developing their own
systems for evaluating economic conditions in
foreign countries. But regulators must also be
abletojudgeindependently whether ornot a par-
ticular bank has too many resources in countries
with a high level ofcountry risk. Improved meth-
ods ofassessing such risks would result in greater
uniformity in the treatment of individual banks
as well as a better assessment of U.S. banks'
overall risk. Both the Comptroller ofthe Curren-
cy and the Federal Reserve System are now de-
veloping systems to measure and monitor coun-
try risk.
Other considerations must also be taken into
account:
"Bank regulators need to be sensitive to the
fact that admonishments to banks can re-
sult in damage to the credit-worthiness of
bOrrowing countries. As a possible way of
dealing with this potential problem, the
Federal Reserve is exploring a supervisory
approach that would focus on the degree of
country concentration of foreign loans in
portfolios of individual banks and on the
quality of information possessed by banks
in assessing the degree of risk attached to
theirinternational loans. "14
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To help meet r~gulatory and bank informa-
tion needs, a number ofinternational agencies
arenow attempting to improve international.fi-
nancialstatistics.1sForexample, the Bankfor In-
ternatiqn~l Settlem~nts, with the cooperation of
majorcentraLbapks, is now working to develop
newdataon.externalprivate borrowingandlend-
ing. Improvedstatistics ofthis type should rein-
force the effectiveness ofbanks' own procedures
for assessing risk, and should reduce supervisory
burdensaccordingly.
***
In conclusion, there are important differences
between banking risk and sovereign risk. Bank-
ing risk is essentially the same at home and
abroad. Despite greater potential difficulties in
obtaining information on foreign borrowers, the
credit factors involved are fundamentally the
same as in domestic lending. Sovereign risk is a
different matter, for which there is no domestic
equivalent risk. Foreign governments can pre-
vent the conversion oflocal currency into foreign
currencies-which amounts to default on a na-
tional (but not private) level. There have been
few cases ofsuch default, but regulators remain
concerned about the possibility.
Ba.Il~shave been successful in reducing their
loss exposure, judging by the relatively low losses
they have experienced in their foreign oper-
ations. However, to the extent that official inter-
national lending represents a form of insurance,
banks have all incentive to take greater risk, and
internationalsupervision must act to counteract
that tendency.The public has an interest in en-
suring that risk remains within acceptable limits,
throughappropriate actions by bank regulators.
At the sametime, this emphasis upon risk-taking
should not interfere with the ability of U.S.
banks to function as international lenders. Bank-
ingl'laysa majorrole in encouraging economic
develol'tnent through the financing of world
trade and investment. Therefore, efforts to im-
prove international banking supervision must ul-
timately be judged by their contribution to the
world as well as. the U.S. bankingsystem.FOOTNOTES
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